With the release of President Bush's first National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002, the administration articulated a bold claim about the use of military force that had been crystallizing in American strategic circles over the previous decade. According to a central element in the emerging -Bush D octrine‖, launching attacks against so-called rogue states suspected of pursuing weapons of mass destruction was a normatively legitimate strategically necessary response to the changing threat environment.
This paper examines the attitudes on preventive war in the case of the Peoples Republic of China. Specifically it asks how Chinese elites -government officials and academics -view preventive war in the wake of American efforts to recast the preventive war norm and the invasion so Iraq. How do Chinese elites react to the logic and normative claims at the heart of the Bush administration's -pr eemption doctrine‖? Do Chinese elites reject it in normative terms reminiscent of the antipreventive war attitudes prevalent in the United States during the decades after World War II? Or have Chinese elites accepted America's position on this issue as a precedent that the Chinese government itself might mobilize politically in potential conflicts on its periphery? . WORK UNIT NUMBER
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advances in military technologies and effectiveness while others languish, the size of different states'
armed forces rise and fall. The dilemma this dynamic creates is serious: how does a state protect itself when faced with the growing relative power of a potential rival? The preventive war option is based on the stark conclusion that it is better to strike this potential rival in the near term, in the early phases of a power shift, than to face a possible war in the future that would be fought at a much higher cost.
It is important to point out that according to this logic there is no certainty that a future war will actually be fought against the rising power. Nor is there any certainty that the rising power will actually use its new capabilities in an aggressive way. Unlike true -preemption,‖ which is a tactical first move to blunt an actual impending attack by another state, preventive war is driven by worst-case assumptions about possible futures that remain blanketed in uncertainty. Yet given the inherent uncertainties of the international system and the future behavior of potential rivals, the state launching a preventive attack simply does not want to face the mere possibility of a more costly future war. 2 But this defining feature of preventive war -one launched by a state out of fear of an inherently unknown future -presents its own serious problems. From a purely strategic perspective one must ask whether it is smart or foolish militarily to launch a war, to assume its costs on your own initiative, when there is no way to know that you were actually avoiding a worse war in the future. Even German
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the consummate statesman of power politics, had difficulty calculating the immediate costs of war against alternative futures. -The idea of undertaking a war because it might be inevitable later on and might then have to be fought under less favorable conditions has always remained foreign to me,‖ Bismarck noted, -a nd I have always fought against it…For I cannot look into Providence's cards in such a manner that I would know things beforehand.‖ 3 From a normative perspective preventive war can be just as problematic. Is preventive war a legitimate act of self-defense, or is it an act of aggression by a state mainly interested in shaping the distribution of power in its favor? This is not an idle academic question; how it is answered can, and has, decisively shaped both the domestic and international politics of war. In the aftermath of World War I a prominent international norm emerged linking preventive war with international aggression, thus casting preventive war as normatively illegitimate strategic behavior. This norm had a potent restraining effect at the domestic level on American strategic decision making in the decades after World War II, as American leaders wrestled with their security options -including preventive war -in the face of the rising power of the USSR and Communist China. American leaders not only believed strongly that preventive war was in fact aggressive war, and thus unacceptable for the United States, they also worried that if America violated the -anti-preventive war norm,‖ other states would be much more likely to launch their own wars under the guise of preventive self-defense. 4 In one of many examples, President Eisenhower firmly rejected the persistent requests of his top military advisors and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to launch preventive attacks against southern
Chinese military facilities during the Formosa Straight crisis in early 1955. In his explanation to Dulles, Eisenhower proclaimed, -It is oftentimes necessary to take heavy liabilities from a purely military standpoint in order to avoid being in the position of being an aggressor and the initiator of war. This is a price which often has to be paid and which may have to be paid in this case.‖ 5 In turn, America's respect for the anti-preventive war norm over many decades helped sustain a broader international belief that preventive war was indeed aggression, and thus normatively unacceptable. In a fascinating echo of To properly frame this inquiry the paper will first discuss several key theoretical issues central to As discussed in detail below, the findings from both interviews and the Chinese media demonstrate that Chinese elites overwhelmingly reject American claims on behalf of a new preemption doctrine. There is no evidence that Chinese elites are inclined to accept either the normative language or the strategic rationale for a preemption/preventive war policy to deal with China's own security challenges. In fact, the dominant reaction was to see the preemption doctrine as a form of aggressive warfare, as a tool for entrenching American hegemony in the international system, and as a direct threat to the international norm the Chinese most strongly defend -the sovereign right to non-interference.
The Power Shift Problem and the Preventive War Temptation
The preventive motive for war emerges directly from the basic background conditions of world politics so clearly laid out by realist scholars of international relations. It has become a truism in the field that individual states in the international system exist in a condition of anarchy, which simply means there is no higher authority among or above the states to provide security. In the extreme, power determines whether states survive, how well they can defend their territory and population from predation, whether they can secure access to critical resources and trading partners essential for economic well-being, and whether they can set their own policies free from the coercive influence of other states. Power determines the hierarchy of states in the international system, thereby determining which states set the rules for international interaction. Power decides the outcome of the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise among states.
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While a given state's power may be a function of the material resources it can mobilize, power can only be measured relative to the resources other states can deploy. According to this view, state leaders must remain fixated on how strong their state is compared to others. Most important for the preventive motive for war, the relative distribution of power among a given set of states is rarely static.
As Robert Gilpin notes, states will experience different rates of growth (or decline) in the economic, military and technological bases of power. 13 Even during periods in which all major states are experiencing growth in the material bases of power, some states may simply grow faster than others, setting up an inevitable shift in the relative distribution of power as some states threaten to narrow the power gap or even exceed the power of others.
These shifts in relative power can have profound implications for state behavior. What is at stake if a power shift occurs is -f uture influence over a range of diverse and partly unpredictable issues.‖ 14 The rising state, to the degree that it is dissatisfied with the international status quo, -w ill seek to alter the system in ways that favor [its] interests.‖ It may seek to do so by -c hang[ing] the rules governing the international system, the division of the spheres of influence, and…the international distribution of territory.‖ 15 The dominant state must anticipate that as a potential adversary's power rises, so will its -a ppetites.‖ 16 In other words, the dominant state must confront the possibility of direct challenges to a status quo it wants to preserve, or more specifically, a direct challenge to its own core interests.
The great strategic dilemma in this situation is to determine exactly how to respond to this threatened or ongoing power shift. As prominent realist scholars have acknowledged, the material base of realist theory does not determine a single solution for what should actually be done in response to a power shift. 17 In fact, realist theory may provide the basis for a range of policy options that includes building a better defense against a direct military attack, 18 deterrence of the emerging power through the threat of retaliation against aggressive actions, 19 or making concessions to, thereby appeasing, the rising state so it does not see the need to use force as a way to satisfy its goals. 20 The final option in response to a feared or ongoing power shift is preventive action. The most extreme form is preventive attack, when force is used to destroy or seriously degrade specific rising capabilities before they are fully formed. Unlike a balancing response meant simply to deter or defend against the actual use of such rising capabilities, preventive action is a refusal to accept this growth in the first place, an effort to arrest the kinds of power shifts that introduce greater uncertainty and fear among states. Gilpin actually calls preventive war the -most attractive response‖ for a leader facing this strategic question because it -e liminate[s] the source of the problem.‖ 21 Michael Howard goes so far as to connect most wars in the modern state system to the preventive motive that emerges from the struggle for power in anarchy. As an alternative, or supplement, to material factors scholars are highlighting the impact of beliefs and ideas about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of different forms of behavior on how states respond to the problems they face. These beliefs may be shared among multiple states at the international level or emerge from the strategic cultures of specific states. In the case of the preventive war temptation, while the material reality of shifting power in the international system creates the strategic problem in the first place, how a given state responds to that power shift can be shaped in decisive ways by beliefs about whether preventive war is a legitimate form of self-defense or if it represents an act of international aggression. Before examining the normative aspects of preventive war, it is useful to discuss in more detail the literature on ideas, culture, and norms in world politics.
The Impact of Norms and Culture on Strategic Decision Making
In contrast to material arguments about state behavior, the ideational approach emphasizes ideas or beliefs about certain types of behavior. 26 The basic claim from this perspective is that political leaders will not make choices based on material factors alone; they may also be influenced by collectively held beliefs about what forms of behavior are either acceptable or unacceptable in a specific type of situation.
Norms are commonly defined as -c ollective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity,‖ 27 or more simply, a norm should establish a -standard of right or wrong‖ that presents -pr escriptions or proscriptions for behavior.‖ 28 In the context of any given strategic problem, these beliefs about the various options available do not dictate state behavior. Norms may, however, in Nina
Tannenwald's words, -shape realms of possibility. They influence (increase or decrease) the probability situations. At the most basic level, the sovereignty principle that creates the political structure of the international system itself depends on broad respect for a norm prohibiting intervention in other states' domestic affairs. Without this norm, the very concept of a system composed of autonomous political entities has little practical meaning. While military force may be retained as the ultimate guarantee that a state's sovereignty will be protected, the idea of sovereign rights to non-interference has a powerful restraining effect on states even in the absence of physical restraints. 31 In more specific cases, scholars have explored such shared international norms as those prohibiting genocide, 32 the use of chemical and nuclear weapons, 33 and trafficking in slaves and endangered species, 34 and norms that promote such state obligations in war as humane treatment and protections for enemy prisoners and non-combatants. 35 The question over whether torture is a legitimate means to extract intelligence from captured -e nemy combatants‖ in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars created a firestorm of controversy in the United States.
Many argued, and the U.S. Senate endorsed the view, that even if torture proved to be an effective method for generating important information for the global war on terrorism and the war against the Iraqi insurgency, it violates both an international norm prohibiting torture and runs contrary to an American identity that finds torture barbaric and unacceptable for its own behavior. 36 Collective beliefs about proper behavior may be confined to a particular state. At this level, our focus would be on a collective sense of identity and character shared within a domestic society, and how this sense of identity will shape beliefs about what behaviors are consistent or inconsistent with that identity. 37 The great American statesman George Kennan argues that any state must be guided by certain principles in its foreign policy. Gulf wars was profoundly affected by a belief about the character of America as a -c ivilized‖ state that made the use of nuclear weapons after 1945 morally repulsive. This self-identity produced a widespread (though not universal) sense that -we just don't do things like this,‖ even though in material terms the use of nuclear weapons may have made sense in these conflicts. 41 As we will see below, a robust literature points to strategic culture as an important variable shaping China's security policy. If these scholars are correct, then the culture variable may provide valuable insight into how Chinese elites view preventive war. Before turning to the alternative characterizations of China's strategic culture it is important first to examine the normative dimensions of preventive war specifically in more detail.
The Anti-Preventive War Norm
As noted earlier, most scholars have treated the preventive war option from a purely materialstrategic perspective. The actual history of this concept in American policy making and at the international level, however, shows that in the last century preventive war was not treated as a purely military problem. Preventive war, like using military force under almost any circumstances, carries normative meaning that can shape the domestic and international politics of security policy in decisive ways. This is derived from the fact that prevention as a motive for using military force is intimately linked with the normatively-laden concepts of aggression and self-defense. Because preventive war by definition only makes sense when described as a way to avoid future harm at the hands of a growing potential adversary, some have cast it as -a nticipatory self-defense.‖ Yet because this option is launched to prevent a shift in the balance of power, and not to stop an actual impending attack, it can also be seen as an act of unprovoked aggression. resolution. Similar initiatives in the western hemisphere followed the example set in Europe. 47 Viewed in retrospect, the burst of enthusiasm for renouncing war in the 1920s and early 1930s
was widely condemned as -utopianism,‖ a naïve and dangerous blindness to the realities of world politics that seemed to dictate the inevitability of power struggles and armed conflict. After all, critics noted correctly, the earnest popular quest for great power peace, and the subsequent multilateral agreements condemning war as criminal behavior, did nothing to stop Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan from unleashing the violent fury of war once again. 48 Many concluded that this apparently desperate desire for peace actually encouraged the aggressors of World War II. 49 In the United States, the realist school of international relations was ascendant, and statesmen were advised to move beyond earlier dreams of renouncing war. In this intellectual climate, one might expect that the arguments casting preventive war as legitimate self-defense would provide enough normative cover to ease whatever moral qualms this policy might stir up within the American political system. If the prohibition on aggressive war from the inter-war period was still taken seriously, then a radically expanded definition of self-defense might be the solution. had forged normative shifts in attitudes toward war and its initiation. According to Dulles, -we belong to a generation that has already subjected countless human beings to incredible horror,‖ the result of which is an emotional response-a -fear of war as never before.‖ From this emotional reaction comes a normative commitment to a -m oral condemnation of war [that] has become so well-nigh universal and so intense that it has to be reckoned with as never before…We are moved as never before to reject war as a means for achieving good ends.‖ As Dulles saw it, -I n the United States there is a public sentiment which, if maintained, will be a fierce obstacle against any temptation to launch a so-called ‗preventive war' or deliberately to prod or trick potential enemies into acts which could plausibly be made a pretext In the coming years, despite the tremendous strategic pressure created by the projected threat of Soviet atomic weapons, American leaders could not betray the principles that had emerged from the tragic experience imposed on them by their recently defeated enemies. Most important, the vast majority of
Americans at all levels of the political system refused to cast themselves into the moral pit defined by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan by succumbing to the preventive war temptation. Truman administration officials condemned preventive war as undemocratic and contrary to America's character, as morally corrosive, a weapon of dictators that was simply unacceptable to the United States. In the Formosa Strait crisis, President Eisenhower declared unambiguously that the United States must accept the military liabilities of allowing China to strengthen its military capabilities, rather than assume the moral and political liabilities of initiating -a ggressive‖ action against this adversary. President Johnson ruled out preventive attack against China's emerging nuclear program in 1964, afraid of the political black mark this act would carry, both at home and abroad. In the wake of Israel's 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq, the Reagan administration went so far as to co-sponsor with Iraq a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning its ally for violating international norms against aggression and for further destabilizing a dangerous region. 55 Despite this long-standing tradition of rejecting the preventive war option as unacceptable aggression, by the early 1990s America's commitment to the anti-preventive war norm was loosening as new arguments emerged claiming that initiating preventive war against -rogue states‖ in pursuit of nuclear weapons should be considered a normatively permissible strategic option to uphold the global interest in stopping nuclear proliferation. In the spring of 1994, at the height of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the Clinton administration ultimately rejected preventive war because of its military risks.
Yet in a dramatic departure from previous cases the preventive war option was evaluated without a hint of the normative stigma of aggression that it carried for Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and arguably Reagan. 56 Building on this emerging domestic acceptance of preventive war from the early 1990s, the George W. Bush administration formally articulated a new argument that preventive war must be considered a legitimate measure of collective self-defense, and put this conception of preventive war to work against Iraq in 2003. 57 It is important to note that the 2002 NSS explicitly acknowledges that the United States was pursuing a change in the normative boundaries traditionally placed around the notion of -a nticipatory self-defense.‖ In broad terms, the document rightly notes, -For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.‖ But as the NSS admits, the standards that normatively and legally legitimized true preemption were high. The state had to face an actual -i mminent threat‖ most often demonstrated by -a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.‖ According to the Bush administration, this standard was no longer valid in an age of rogue states and terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the NSS asserts that -we‖ would ever attack at all, 59 to justify launching a war as genuine self-defense.
Here we come to the crux of one problem potentially created by an assertive American effort to alter the normative distinction between defensive preemption and aggressive preventive war. 
Chinese Strategic Culture and Preventive War
A prominent body of research explores the deep historical roots and contemporary impact of strategic culture on key elements of China's security policy. In fact, while there seems to be a widely shared consensus among students of Chinese history and foreign affairs that strategic culture is an essential variable shaping China's behavior, there is a robust ongoing debate over how Chinese elites actually tend to view -the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary, and the efficacy of military force.‖ 65 This dispute specifically revolves around whether Chinese strategic culture is more war-prone or temperate and defense-oriented. Given the tremendous potential for continued systemaltering growth in its power in the coming decades, and the remaining uncertainty over how China will actually use its growing capabilities, strategic culture might offer important clues for anticipating China's future behavior. For the purposes of this paper, Chinese reactions to the Bush administration's -pr eemption‖ doctrine, particularly the likelihood that China will either be receptive or resistant to the logic of preventive war, may be shaped by its preexisting strategic culture.
Scholars essentially advance three alternative views on China's strategic orientation toward the role of military force in state affairs. The first characterization, which can be considered the traditional view most widely shared by students of China, is that it has a defense-oriented culture that marginalizes the role of violence and war. Drawing primarily from the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, and Sun Tzu, this cultural orientation emphasizes -a preference for peaceful strategies rather than aggressive ones,‖ the -r eluctance to use force,‖ 66 a pessimistic view on -the ability to eliminate external threats with military means,‖ 67 and the belief that -t o seek domination by force will simply turn the world against you.‖ Despite the diversity of the individual sources addressing this topic, they are remarkably consistent in how they characterize the concept of preventive war/preemption 71 and Bush administration policy. The perspectives can be distilled into a few salient points:
There is no evidence of any inclination to adopt the normative language or strategic rationale for preemption/preventive war offered by the United States.
Preventive war is aggression/an offensive use of force.
Preventive war is a tool for cementing American hegemony.
Preventive war is a violation of the most important international norm -the sovereign right to non-interference.
Japan is the country most likely to follow the U.S. preemption model. 72 The overwhelming consensus in these Chinese media sources, a position asserted repeatedly and emphatically, is that the Bush administration's preemption policy is nothing more than a tool of American the ability to manage the many problems that the war produced, and given the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the invasion was for nothing. The consequence of the Bush administration's willingness to act on the principles in the preemption doctrine was to make America itself a danger to the rest of the world, rather than a source of security against real dangers. His colleagues agreed fervently with each point made, and in each graduate student focus group the same points were raised independently. Only two CSU graduate students out of the 120 interviewed supported the American invasion of Iraq. But as we saw in the previous data on Chinese attitudes reflected in the Open Source
Center database (see footnote 84), they did so not because they thought Iraq posed a growing international threat that must be stanched, but because of the brutality of the Saddam Hussein regime. 85 When this pro-war position was stated in separate focus groups it sparked an immediate, negative reaction from the other participants.
Echoing the dominant view in the Chinese media reports, the widely repeated belief at CSU was that the Bush administration's preemption doctrine was not meant to serve international security interests but to lock in American hegemony. These Chinese academics, and particularly the students, were highly sensitive to a perceived double-standard imposed by the United States. According to this view, the new standards proposed by the United States for legitimate preemption were meant for America's use, or for American-led interventions, only; other states were not permitted to adopt the new preemption norms to deal with their own security problems.
It is important to note that Chinese respondents did not interpret the Bush administration's efforts to gain acceptance for looser preemption standards to be an effort to reshape an international norm.
Instead, it was seen as a unilateral declaration of America's right to take action, even if much of the rest of the world objected. This raises a serious question about the hegemon's ability to reshape international norms, as Brooks and Wohlforth suggest it can and should (see footnote 60). The hegemon might certainly be able to act without external constraints based simply on its overwhelming power; these Chinese respondents bluntly recognized the fact of American power and the unchecked capabilities it implies. But generating acceptance from other states that these acts are justified by new normative standards is a very different challenge. According to the consensus view among these academics at CSU and the military officers interviewed, America is not in a special position to rewrite the rules of the international system to legitimate its self-serving policies. 86 Some saw the emphasis on weapons of mass destruction in the Bush doctrine as an indication that America's specific intent was to use preemption to sustain American supremacy in nuclear weapons and lock in a permanently asymmetric power relationship with regional states that might pursue nuclear weapons of their own for deterrence purposes.
Not a single respondent in the interviews and focus groups supported the notion that looser preemption standards might serve China's security needs in the future. This conclusion was based on three general points raised by many respondents. First, preventive military action was not seen as an applicable strategic concept for the various security concerns on China's periphery. 87 Interestingly, when
Taiwan was raised all respondents argued that this was an internal, domestic Chinese problem. Since the logic of preventive war applies to power shifts among independent states, preventive war or preemption was simply seen as irrelevant. Second, most linked preemption with America's experience in Iraq, which generated great skepticism over whether this policy option could actually achieve useful goals without producing a range of unforeseen, and unmanageable, problems that would negate any value preemption might hold. Many drew the conclusion that America is far too confident in the use of military force to deal with foreign problems. Finally, the strong consensus view shared by the PLA officers, the faculty and the students, which was raised independently in each interview session and without prompting by the interviewer, was that preventive war violates China's cultural preference for creating the Confucian ideal of -h armonious society‖ and ensuring that its rise as a great power in accomplished peacefully.
Conclusion
In the decades following World War II, American fidelity to the anti-preventive war norm played an important role in sustaining international consensus on this point. In the wake of 9/11, American leadership sustained a political drive to gain support for the belief that new threats justified new normative standards of military action for -a nticipatory self-defense.‖ It is clear from the evidence presented in this paper that, in the case of China at least, the Bush administration failed to -r eshape‖ the norms and standards of legitimacy that for much of the 20 th century distinguished defensive preemption from aggressive preventive war. This new normative claim met with a skeptical, even hostile, reception in China. In fact, Chinese media sources routinely assert that America simply exploited the 9/11 tragedy to justify a global strategy aimed at preserving its dominance in the system. 88 Beyond the empirical significance of these findings, it is also useful to explore possible countrymen that preemption/preventive war is a legitimate and useful strategic principle that China must take seriously. As David Kang contends, -China's concern for sovereignty‖ is a -central aspect of its identity.‖ 89 As long as a strong reflexive impulse to defend the sovereignty principle remains central to
Chinese strategic culture, and preventive war is seen as an instrument of American hegemonic power, it is unlikely that Chinese elites will embrace, or even tolerate, the efforts of the United States to reshape the norms bounding preventive war.
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